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INTRODUCTION
The fair use doctrine is one of the most divisive issues in copyright law today. As Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel wrote,
“[n]umerous commentators have lambasted the fair use doctrine as
hopelessly unpredictable and indeterminate.”1 While a few countries, including the United States, have added a fair use doctrine to
their legal codes, many others have criticized the defense for being
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1
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715,
716 (2001).
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fickle, and for potentially leading to much uncertainty.2 In 1994 the
Supreme Court decided Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which
became a seminal case in the fair use doctrine’s evolution.3 With
Campbell, the growth of the transformative nature of a work as a
deciding factor in a fair use analysis began in force. Pushed forward
with Justice Souter’s opinion, the idea of transformativeness has
only continued to grow. In 2013, amid numerous cases decided using the fair use analysis, two stood out from the rest: Cariou v.
Prince4 and Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.5 Additionally, in 2014 the Seventh Circuit added another important ruling to the canon of fair
use analysis with Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC.6 The rulings of
these cases, which depended heavily on the idea of transformativeness, expanded the law’s previous boundaries regarding what could
be considered transformative.
This Note will explore the contours of the fair use doctrine, its
expansion, and the increased use of transformative use as a fair use
defense. Part I introduces a brief history of copyright protection
and the development of fair use. Part II focuses on Judge Pierre
Leval’s 1990 Harvard Law Review article Toward a Fair Use Standard.7 This article was in part written as a reaction to the Second
Circuit’s disagreements with two copyright cases over which Leval
presided while acting as a district court judge in the Southern District of New York. Part III discusses the immediate impact of Judge
Leval’s article on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Campbell. Part
IV follows the recent growth of transformative use in cases such as
Cariou, Seltzer, Sconnie, and looks at certain issues with Leval’s
interpretation. Over the years fair use has changed dramatically.
Judge Leval’s article played a significant role in that change, advancing the doctrine and the effect of “transformativeness” to a
point where even Judge Leval may not have approved.

2
3
4
5
6
7

See id. at 717.
114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).
766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
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I. COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE: A LOOK BACK
To effectively assess the idea of fair use as brought forward in
Campbell, it is helpful to understand the history of the doctrine and
its place within copyright law. The British Crown originally saw the
printing press as an instrument that needed to be controlled in order to prevent propaganda and the dissemination of dangerous
ideas.8 As the Crown loosened its grip on granting only specific
publishers the right to print and distribute books, the printers’ consortiums went to parliament looking for government protections
which might provide financial incentives for authors to right and
publishers to publish.9 In response, England’s parliament signed
the Statute of Anne, the world’s first codified copyright statute,
into law in 1710.10 The law, which granted rights to authors and the
printers acting as their assignees, protected works from being appropriated entirely and reprinted exactly as they had originally appeared.11 Similarly, the first recognizable implementation of an implied fair use doctrine can also be traced back to English roots from
approximately the same era.12 However, the Statute of Anne did
not address issues of “fractional copying” or any significant similarity among works. Soon after the Statute of Anne was enacted,
English authors and publishers deemed it unfavorable to their interests.13 It was these publishers who lobbied for new laws making
it illegal to “print, publish, import, or sell any abridgement of [a
copyrighted work], or any translation thereof without the consent
of the author or proprietor first obtained in writing.”14
English courts began to hear cases concerning the abridgement
of works and whether the creation of these condensed versions fell
under the scope of the Statute of Anne’s protection. Courts held
that differences existed between “real and fair” abridgements and
books that were “colorably shortened.”15 This allowed for “real
8

See Pierre Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2002).
See id.
10
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 § 1 (Eng.).
11
See Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1381 (2011).
12
See id. at 1380–82.
13
See id. at 1381.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1391–93. The concept of a “real and fair” abridgement is a use taking aspects
of another work but one which is used for the furtherance of learning, invention, or a basis
9
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and fair” abridgements to qualify as new works under new copyright and left “colorably shortened” abridgments as infringing
works.16 The factors in the Statute of Anne that led to a finding of
infringement were similar to those maintained by the United
States’ current fair use doctrine.17 Both doctrines determine infringements on a case-by-case analysis.18 Outcomes are based on
the amount and context of the work taken, and include in their analyses the understanding that a work condensed for research or educational purposes would not harm the market for an original work.19
As the first copyright law of its kind, the Statue of Anne established
precedent in securing protection for the works of authors and publishers, precedent that would be further advanced by the Constitution and legislature of the United States.
Until the signing of the United States Constitution in 1789, the
Statute of Anne remained the basis for copyright law in colonial
America.20 Between 1776 and 1789 the newly formed states established copyright laws to govern the protection of works created
within their territories, many of which were close approximations
of the Statute of Anne.21 With the ratification of the Constitution,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 granted copyright protection to its
citizenry through Congress’ power “to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”22 In 1790, the United States passed its first federal
Copyright Act which established a creator’s initial rights, set time
limits for copyright ownership, and made it possible to renew existof judgment upon the original work. A work that is “colorably shortened” is a work that is
created by merely omitting and transposing parts of an original work. A similar distinction
is made by current US judges in their examination the whether a work can be protected by
the fair use doctrine. See Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng.Rep. 489 2 Atk.141 (1740) (No. 130).
16
See Sag, supra note 11, at 1390.
17
See id. at 1394.
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 932 (2003).
21
See id at 933–36. (highlighting that Delaware was the only state to not ratify any sort
of statue granting copyright protection to its citizens).
22
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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ing copyrights, features which were already established in the various state statutes, but which could now serve as a unified federal
rule, pulling the states into harmony with one another.23 Perhaps by
an oversight of the drafters, the Act only protected specific works
including books, maps, and charts.24 However, with the advancement of technology, in 1831, Congress passed a new Copyright Act
which increased the copyright terms, and added musical works to
the list of protectable expressions.25
Justice Story’s decision in Folsom v. Marsh is considered one of
the first opinions to incorporate these copyright protections from
the newly implemented 1831 Copyright Act with the ideas which
would later become part of the fair use doctrine.26 Here, Justice
Story was faced with an abridgement of a twelve-volume biography
of George Washington.27 In deciding the case, Justice Story used a
number of English court decisions pertaining to the abridgement of
written works, as the American judicial system had not yet deliberated on many similar abridgement issues.28 Justice Story ultimately decided to enjoin the publication of the work, finding it to be an
infringement of the original biography.29 Some scholars consider
Justice Story’s decision to have been an attempt to ultimately safeguard copyrights by determining that unless a work qualified for an
exception under the concept of fair use, the work should be held as
an infringement.30
23

See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 20, at, 937–39.
See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831); MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 7 (Matthew Bender rev. ed.
2010); Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets and Liberal
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 196–98 (2008) (asserting that
during the development of early copyright laws, “Authorship” was limited to the written
works noted above, and was not extrapolated out to include the other types of work later
to be protected, such as music).
25
See Act of Feb. 8, 1831), ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 24, App. 7(d)(4)(a).
26
Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor In Fair Use Doctrine,
ALB. L. REV. 677, 687 (1995).
27
See Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175, 345–46 (Cir. Ct. D.Mass. 1841).
28
See generally id. (discussing cases regarding the creation of works using large portions
of already existing books in order to supersede the need for the original, or deny the right
to publish letters not written by the author or publisher); Sag, supra note 11, at 1377.
29
See Folsom, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. at 349.
30
See Oren Bracha, supra note 24, at 229.
24
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In his decision, Justice Story noted the factors which would later become the categories of fair use as codified in the Copyright
Act:
So, in cases of copyright . . . the question of piracy,
often depend[s] upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of the other;
the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus
used; the objects of each work . . . [f]or example, no
one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely
from the original work, if his design be really and
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and
reasonable criticism.31
This statement most accurately reflected Justice Story’s decision. He continued “[i]f [an author] thus cites the most important
parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the
use of the original work . . . such a use will be deemed in law a piracy.”32 Justice Story ultimately decided that if a “fair and bona fide
abridgement” were produced, the work would not be held to be a
piracy, but rather a new work protectable on its own.33 While the
decision in Folsom instilled in the law a sense of what would be considered fair use, the decision also formed a broad enlargement of
the copyright laws in general, which greatly limited the ability of
authors to use direct passages of works created by others.
The Copyright Act of 1976, signed into law by President Ford
in 1978, was the first major overhaul of American copyright law
since the 1909 Act—which had mainly extended the terms of copyright available under the 1831 Act.34 By the 1970s, with the advent
and growth of television, motion pictures, sound recordings, and
31

See Folsom 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175 at 344–45.
Id.
33
See id. at 345 (“[W]hat constitutes a fair and bona fide abridgment, in the sense of
the law, is one of the most difficult points, under particular circumstances, which can well
arise for judicial discussion. It is clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of
parts of the original work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held
to be such an abridgment. There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials,
and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the
scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original
work.”).
34
Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
32
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radio, the Copyright Act of 1909 had become severely outdated. 35
After becoming party to the Universal Copyright Convention, a
multinational treaty signed by forty total nations in 1951, Congress
determined it was time to reevaluate America’s copyright laws.36
Congress amended the Copyright act of 1909 to reflect the ratification, adding subsection (c) to section 9 of the Act.37 The 1976 Copyright Act, which remains the basis for contemporary US copyright
law, established protections for new categories of works, extended
the terms of copyrights from previous acts, and among other
things, instituted the fair use doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 107.38
The fair use provision of the Copyright Act adopted many of
the same elements Justice Story noted in Folsom.39 The fair use factors acknowledge the importance of copyright protection while still
recognizing certain uses of copyrighted material as legal.40 The Act
notes four factors that are to be considered in any fair use analysis:
1. The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; 2. the nature of the
copyrighted work; 3. the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and 4. the effect on the potential
market or value of the copyrighted work.41
The legislative history of the Act speaks to the understanding
that during periods of technological advancement there should be a

35

See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:45 (2014).
See id. § 1:72.
37
Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. 83-743, 61 Stat. 655. See also PATRY, supra note 35,
§ 1:63 (“The subsection (1) provided national eligibility for works whose country of origin
was another UCC country; (2) exempted such works from the need to provide reciprocal
mechanical reproduction rights similar to those found in 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(e); (3) exempted
from the deposit requirement all works by authors of a UCC country and those works first
published in a UCC country; and (4) exempted such works from the manufacturing
clause requirements, provided that a ‘UCC notice’ was affixed.”).
38
See Act of Oct. 19, 1978, Pub L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
39
See Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C. Mass.
1841).
40
See 1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBL.
& THE ARTS § 1:72 (3d ed. 2014).
41
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
36
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broad explanation of what fair use is and how it is to be applied.42
The House Report examined that an “endless variety of situations
and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases preclud[ing] the formulations of exact rules in the statute.”43
Therefore, “the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”44 While it was Congress’ intention to give judges a significant amount of discretion
regarding their application of fair use analyses, there were critics of
this decision, specifically regarding Congress’ choice to give so
much power to judges— limiting the congressional power to establish a proper schema for solving fair use issues. As Leon Seltzer
wrote in 1977, “Congress . . . has failed to articulate a coherent rationale for copyright . . . failed to define fair use . . . introduced confusions between fair use and exempted use . . . and it has in the end
tossed the fair use question, now thoroughly enmeshed in contradictions, back to the courts.”45
II. TOWARD A FAIR USE STANDARD AND ITS EFFECT
Judge Leval attempted to reduce the confusion left by both
Congress and inconsistent judicial opinions regarding fair use analysis with his article Toward a Fair Use Standard.46 The Copyright
Act, Judge Leval explained, gives “little guidance” as to how
judges should actually analyze fair use in real world situations.47
Leval observed that the Act offered no assistance for determining
how to distinguish what is “acceptable” from what is “excessive”
in terms of material taken from one work and used in another.48
Judges, Leval believed, had not yet come to a consensus regarding
the correct way to perform a proper fair use analysis. As such,
42

See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
Id.
44
Id.
45
LEON SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT: THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 17 (1977).
46
See Leval, supra note 7, at 1106–07 nn.9–10. (pointing out a number of inconsistent
judgments in which the court of appeals reversed the district court’s finding for the
defendant, and was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court and considering the instances
of “divided courts” where the Supreme Court was split on an issue of fair use).
47
See id. at 1105–06.
48
See id. at 1106.
43
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judgments were rendered on cases, only later to be overruled, overturned, or remanded by judges of higher courts.49 Judge Leval
ended his introduction by expressing the opinion that fair use
“need not be so mysterious or dependent on intuitive judgments.”50 However, he proceeded to explain fair use according to a
system of his own belief, one that may have been developed out of
his displeasure at having had the Second Circuit challenge and
overturn cases he himself had decided.51
Toward a Fair Use Standard was in part influenced by Judge
Leval’s opinion in Salinger v. Random House, Inc. and the judgment’s later reversal by the court of appeals.52 Salinger concerned
the author J.D. Salinger and an unauthorized biography of his life
written by Ian Hamilton.53 Hamilton approached Salinger looking
for information and seeking Salinger’s approval of the project but
Salinger refused both.54 Salinger had always been a private person,
spending much of the previous thirty years outside the public eye,
“avoiding all publicity.”55 In spite of Salinger’s refusal, Hamilton
proceeded with his research and writing, relying on letters either
sent or received by Salinger which had subsequently been donated
to library collections throughout the country.56 Salinger received a
copy of Hamilton’s work prior to its publication and promptly went
about securing copyrights for each of his seventy-nine unpublished
letters from which Hamilton had taken quotations.57 Salinger de49

See id. at 1106–07.
Leval, supra note 7, at 1107.
51
See id. at 1111. Leval specifically points to analyzing the fair use defense not “simply
to conclude whether or not justification exists,” but rather, “[t]he question remains how
powerful, or persuasive, is the justification, because the court must weigh the strength of
the secondary user’s justification against factors favoring the copyright owner.” Id. To
this question Leval puts forth his own explanation, stating, “I believe the answer to the
question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged
use is transformative.” Id.
52
Id. at 1105 (“The court of appeals’ disagreement with two of my decisions provoked
some rethinking, which revealed that my own decisions had not adhered to a consistent
theory, and, more importantly, that throughout the development of the fair use doctrine,
courts had failed to fashion a set of governing principles or values.”).
53
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
54
See id.
55
Id.
56
See id.
57
See id. at 417.
50
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manded that Hamilton remove all quotations lifted from the unpublished letters. Hamilton responded by revising the work, dramatically reducing the number of direct quotations and the number
of words each quotation used.58 After being provided with a revised
copy of the book to review, Salinger brought suit against Hamilton
and Random House, the publisher. Salinger claimed that Hamilton’s work not only infringed on the copyright of Salinger’s letters,
but also that Salinger would also be irreparably harmed if the biography were published and distributed.59 For those reasons, Judge
Leval granted a temporary restraining order to allow for discovery
and trial. 60
After arguments, Judge Leval denied the permanent injunction
Salinger had requested, determining that Hamilton’s use of the copyrighted materials in the biography was not an infringement and
was protected as a fair use.61 Leval based the decision on his understanding of the fair use analysis—where the first factor and the
transformation of the original work is paramount—and the protections he felt the doctrine afforded to Hamilton’s work.62 Leval used
careful consideration in examining each of the passages either directly quoted or paraphrased from Salinger’s letters. Leval’s understanding rested on the idea that “Salinger’s letters are full of
information about his life upon which the biographer has drawn.”63
Judge Leval determined that “virtually every passage taken by
Hamilton from the [fifty-nine] letters consists primarily of a report
of such historical fact which is not protected by copyright.”64
Leval’s understanding and interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises likely influenced his decision in Salinger. Nation stated that
copyright protection for unpublished materials should outweigh
any claim of fair use only under ordinary circumstances.65 As Leval
58

Id. at 417.
See id.
60
Id.
61
See id. at 428.
62
See id at 423.
63
Id. at 418.
64
Id.
65
See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539
(1985) (concerning a copyright infringement claim brought against amagazine publisher
59
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understood the holding in Nation, fair use could be determined
with regard to unpublished works if the “secondary use is fair, giving due regard for the creator’s right to control the first publication”66 and in such a situation, the use of unpublished material
would “be permitted.”67 Had Salinger’s letters never previously
been exposed or accessible by the public, perhaps Leval would not
have found Random House’s use as qualifying for a fair use defense. However, because the Salinger letters had been on display in
museums and libraries, these items should not be afforded the
same protection as was the unpublished quotations in Nation.68 Accordingly, Judge Leval focused a portion of his fair use analysis on
whether the use of quotations and paraphrasing from the unpublished letters for biographical purposes would decrease the commercial value of the letters if Salinger chose to publish them at a
later time.69 After reviewing each of the four fair use factors, Leval
found no reason to grant the injunction against publication and distribution, concluding “the use of copyrighted matter in the present
form of the book is so minimal and the case favoring a finding of
fair use is so convincing that an injunction cannot be justified.”70
Less than a year later, the Second Circuit reversed Leval’s decision on appeal.71 In an opinion by Judge Newman, the court took
a different position than that advocated by Judge Leval. 72 While
the court of appeals agreed that guidance should come from the
decision in Nation, it indicated that Leval might have misunderstood Nation’s ruling,73 noting that “[p]ertinent to our case is the
fact that the Court underscored the idea that unpublished letters
normally enjoy insulation from fair use copying.”74 In Nation, the
Court gave “special weight to the fact that the copied work is unpublished when considering the second factor, the nature of the
for the use of unauthorized quotations and passages from President Ford’s upcoming
memoir, which had yet to be published).
66
Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 422.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 423.
70
Id. at 426.
71
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Salinger II].
72
See generally id.
73
See id at 96.
74
Id. at 95.
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copyrighted work.”75 In Salinger II, the Second Circuit found that
the first fair use factor weighed in favor of Hamilton because the
quotations and information “enriched” the scholarship behind his
book.76 However, the second factor, buoyed by the ruling in Nation,
heavily favored Salinger, outweighing any potential fair use defense
Hamilton may have gained from the first factor test.77 That the letters were unpublished was a critical aspect of their nature. Though
the Second Circuit agreed with Leval that the Supreme Court’s
decisions regarding unpublished works left some ambiguity, the
Court also recognized that “Judge Leval gave no explicit consideration to the second factor. Since the copyrighted letters were yet
unpublished, the second factor was found to weigh more heavily in
favor of Salinger.”78
The court also disagreed with Leval’s understanding and conclusion regarding the third and fourth factors of the fair use analysis. With respect to the third factor—the amount and substantiality
of the portion used—the court held that “[t]he taking is significant
not only from a quantitative standpoint but from a qualitative
standpoint as well. . . . To a large extent, they make the book worth
reading.”79 The court weighed the fourth factor—the effect on the
market—slightly in Salinger’s favor, reasoning that Salinger could
have earned in excess of $500,000 from selling the right to publish
his letters.80 Whereas Judge Leval decided each of the four factors
in the fair use analysis fell in favor of Hamilton and Random
House, the Second Circuit found only the first factor to have
worked in their favor, holding that this was not an extraordinary
circumstance under Nation to allow the unpublished works to qualify for fair use protection.81
The second case which led Judge Leval to write Toward a Fair
Use Standard dealt with another unauthorized biography, that of L.
Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology. Henry Holt &
Co. (“Holt”) first published Bare-Faced Messiah: The True Story of
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

See id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
Id.
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L. Ron Hubbard, a critical look at Hubbard’s life and the development and growth of Scientology, in England in 1987.82 New Era
Publications International ApS, (“New Era”) a company established to “hold and exploit” the copyrights owned by Hubbard and
the Church of Scientology, sought a preliminary injunction against
the book in the English courts.83 This request was denied.84 British
courts deemed that the injunction was requested with the intention
of blocking criticism of the Church and its founder.85 The following
year the book was published in Australia and Canada—where New
Era also unsuccessfully attempted to block its publication.86
On May 5, 1988 New Era requested a temporary restraining order be issued against Holt to stop publication of Bare-Faced Messiah
in the United States.87 By that date, 12,000 copies had already been
distributed in the United States and a second printing was scheduled for the following morning.88 Judge Leval denied that first request. However, after New Era agreed to indemnify Holt in case of
production losses, Leval granted a temporary restraining order.89
The parties agreed to proceed directly to an expedited trial to determine whether a permanent injunction was warranted.90
Just as in the Salinger cases, New Era Publications International,
ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc. hinged on a fair use analysis. In particular, the case depended on whether unpublished copyrighted
materials used in an unauthorized biography should qualify for protection under the fair use defense, and whether a work using such
potentially infringing material should be restrained from publication.91 Bound by precedent, Judge Leval examined each of the four
factors of fair use analysis to settle the dispute. Leval began by assessing the second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—
82

See New Era Publ’ns Intern., ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1493
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
83
Id. at 1498.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See id.
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
Id. at 1499.
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because New Era had contended that the use of the unpublished
materials was clear copyright infringement.92 Judge Leval again
took the position that the fair use defense could be raised in relation to the use of material from unpublished works.93 Leval even
noted the issues that arose in the court’s reversal of his decision in
Salinger II.94 Leval indicated that the Salinger II court was aware
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Nation was ambiguous regarding whether the fair use doctrine could be applied to the use of
unpublished material.95 Judge Leval determined that, in light of the
ambiguity, it was reasonable to consider that using unpublished
materials would diminish the likelihood of a finding of fair use,
though in certain situations the use of those unpublished materials
might be protected.96
Leval examined the passages that quoted or paraphrased Hubbard’s unpublished letters and accounts, eventually concluding
that “[i]t does not follow that the critic may never take copyrighted
expression from unpublished documents.”97 Leval contended that
an author merely has to make a
compelling demonstration of justification . . . must
show that her use of the protected expression is not
done simply to enliven her text . . . must be reasonably necessary to the communication and demonstration of significant points being made about the subject and must have no significant adverse effect on
the market for the copyrighted work.98
Because Leval found that the use of the unpublished material
could be acceptable under a fair use analysis on that basis, he proceeded to analyze the other factors to determine whether or not the
work was an infringement.99

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

See id. at 1500.
See id.
Id. at 1500.
See id at 1501.
See id. at 1501–03.
Id. at 1503.
Id. at 1504.
Id. at 1504 1523.

2015]

TOWARD A FAIR USE STANDARD TURNS 25

1071

Leval’s decision ultimately became a balancing test among the
fair use factors. His conclusion was, in his own words, “complex.”100 With regard to the published materials, Judge Leval found
them to be sufficiently covered by the fair use doctrine and used
appropriately in Holt’s publication.101 As to the unpublished materials, Leval determined that to conform to the narrowly focused
decision in Nation, Holt was required to “establish a highly convincing case in favor of fair use.”102 Fortunately for Holt, both the
variety of passages submitted and the scope of the work appropriated in Bare-Faced Messiah persuaded Leval to recognize these
takings as a violation of the fair use doctrine.103 Leval agreed that
the use of Hubbard’s own words demonstrated personal qualities
which were impossible to demonstrate through paraphrasing. The
book’s literary value seemingly rested on many of those specific
quotations. Leval also determined that the market for the unpublished material would not be affected by the publication and distribution of Holt’s work.104 However, Leval did note that, unlike in
Salinger, a number of the quotations were used for a purpose greater than merely “enlivening the text,” the amount used were still
held as infringements by the court of appeals.105 Leval concluded
that within the work there existed “a body of material of small, but
more than negligible size, which, given the strong presumption
against fair use of unpublished material, cannot be held to pass the
fair use test.”106
However, Judge Leval’s finding against fair use still did not
meet the necessary threshold to enjoin the publication of the
work.107 The portions of the book Judge Leval found to be infringing were “insignificant.”108 The quotes used did not seem to reach
the “heart” of the book as determined by Nation, nor did the use of
these quotes warrant the award of a permanent injunction relating
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. at 1523.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1523.
Id. at 1524.
Id.
See id. at 1528.
Id. at 1525.
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to the publication or distribution of the book.109 Judge Leval additionally noted that the book had been widely published in England,
Australia, and Canada, and copies had already been printed and
sold within the United States, “the expense and waste involved in
republishing after deleting infringing material would be prohibitive.”110 Leval offered the justification that an injunction would
“diminish public knowledge” regarding a subject of public interest.111 He added that a decision to enjoin the book’s publication
would go against First Amendment reasoning, as “an injunction is
not available to suppress defamatory speech.”112 Thus, in the interest of balancing the fair use analysis and the potential free
speech issue, Judge Leval denied a permanent injunction and allowed the book’s publication and distribution to resume.
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld Judge Leval’s ruling, but
for different reasons.113 In an opinion drafted by Judge Minor, the
court agreed that the “permanent injunction should be denied, but
for a reason wholly different from any of those set forth in the district court’s opinion.”114 The court continued, “[m]oreover, we
disagree with a great deal of what is said in the opinion.”115 As in
Salinger II, the court of appeals found that only the first factor favored the publisher who had used copyrighted material, while factors two, three, and four weighed in favor of the party requesting
the injunction.116 The court of appeals further distinguished Judge
Leval’s reasoning with regard to the second factor.117 In Salinger II
the court had clearly noted that unpublished works “normally enjoy complete protection.”118 In New Era, Leval attempted to create
109

Id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 600
(1985). (determining the “heart” of the book settled on whether or not the information
taken was pivotal to the book, and would affect the sale of the book and the profits
resulting from those sales).
110
Id.
111
New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1525.
112
Id. at 1525 (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557–60 (1976)).
113
New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 577 (2d
Cir.1989) [hereinafter New Era II].
114
Id. at 583.
115
Id.
116
See id. at 581–83.
117
See id. at 583.
118
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987).
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a distinction between unpublished works used in order to “enliven” texts and those used to elucidate “significant points” about
the topic, a distinction which the Court of Appeals did not believe
was warranted in this instance.119
In New Era II, the court explained that even though Judge Leval
had found each of the infringements to be relatively small in nature,
collectively these small infringements created a larger work that
could not pass a fair use analysis.120 Perhaps, if each individual infringement found in Bare-Faced Messiah was the only infringement
used in the work, and the infringements originally published, then
the court might have held it to be a fair use of the material.121 However, in the case of Bare-Faced Messiah the individual infringements
must have been seen as a larger infringing work. Nevertheless, the
court of appeals was required to uphold the district court’s judgment under the theory of laches, citing New Era’s inexcusable delay in bringing the suit.122 The court further found that publication
should not be enjoined because it was economically infeasible to
reprint the book without the infringing material at the time of the
suit.123
Judge Oakes, concurring with the court of appeals’ judgment,
wrote to explain that though he did not completely agree with
Judge Leval’s fair use analysis, the court should not have “unnecessarily” gone out of its way to differentiate its opinion from Leval’s.124 Regarding Bare-Faced Messiah, Judge Oakes agreed that the
119

New Era II, 873 F.2d at 583
See id. at 584; New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1523 (“I conclude that there is a body of
material of small, but more than negligible size, which, given the strong presumption
against fair use of unpublished material, cannot be held to pass the fair use test. I
therefore find, under mandate of the Salinger opinion, that Bare–Faced Messiah to some
degree infringes Hubbard’s copyrights in some of his previously unpublished works.”).
121
See id. at 583–84. (While the court does not state so explicitly, the opinion does note
“Following an exhaustive analysis of the doctrine of fair use, the district court finds in any
event that a small, but more than negligible, body of unpublished material cannot pass the
fair use test, given the strong presumption against fair use of unpublished work. Although
we would characterize the use here as more than “small,” it makes no difference insofar
as entitlement to injunctive relief is concerned.”).
122
Id. at 577, 584–85 (citing New Era Publ’ns Intern., ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc.,
695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
123
See id. at 584.
124
See id. at 585 (Oakes, J. concurring).
120
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district court made the correct assessment of the first factor and
distinguished the case properly from Salinger II.125 Here Judge
Oakes specifically notes that while too much was taken by the author of Bare-Faced Messiah, his understanding was that not all takings from unpublished works should be considered a per se infringement.126 Judge Oakes’ interpretation of the second factor diverged from that of the other judges who decided the case. He
noted that under Nation, the Supreme Court had merely narrowed
the scope of protection when dealing with unpublished materials
and had not cut off the possibility that fair use protections might
apply to works created using unpublished content.127 Oakes remarked that in New Era the second factor “help[ed] to define the
burden that is placed on the defendant to justify its use of copyrighted material.”128 Judge Oakes’ allegiances were split with the
final two factors, as he approved of the court of appeals’ conclusion
with regard to the third factor, but then agreed with the distinction
made in Judge Leval’s assessment of the fourth factor.129 Ultimately, Judge Oakes’ fair use analysis falls between Judge Leval’s and
that raised by Judge Minor in the majority opinion.
In New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt, Co.,
Holt petitioned for a rehearing en banc.130 The court of appeals decided in a 7–5 decision to deny the request. However, in addition to
the basic opinion stating that the rehearing was denied, four judges
signed on to a separate concurring opinion to counter points made
by the dissenting judges. The dissent, written by Judge Newman—
who had also written the opinion reversing Leval’s original Salinger
decision—spoke of the court’s need to clarify its stance on the fair
use issue regarding unpublished copyrighted material and avoid
any misunderstanding stemming from the Court’s recent opposition to Judge Leval’s position.131 The dissent also requested that
the court of appeals both determine whether an injunction was an
appropriate remedy for infringement, and also decide whether the
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

See id at 593.
Id.
See id. at 593.
Id.
See id. at 593–94.
884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989).
See id. at 662–63.
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court should have granted injunctions in Salinger, or if equitable
relief was a sufficient award.132
In response, the opinion by Judge Minor concurring with the
denial for the rehearing en banc noted three main points: (1) the
opinion of the court had been consistent with settled law.(2) Judge
Newman’s dissent for the rehearing lacked the authority to dispel
any of the misunderstandings which may have existed; and (3),
Judge Newman’s dissent did not speak for the full complement of
appellate judges in stating that they were not committed to the language of the prior opinion.133 While the appellate judges may have
decided that clarifying these issues with an en banc decision was
not necessary at that time, clearly, the varying opinions showed a
lack of consensus among the judges. Perhaps, the judges were looking for a clarification that might prove helpful. In this regard it was
Leval who attempted to provide that guidance in Toward a Fair Use
Standard.
Clarifying the issues he saw with the court of appeals’ opinions
in Salinger II and New Era II, and attempting to settle his own issues with the fair use doctrine, Judge Leval wrote, “[t]he court of
appeals’ disagreement with two of my decisions provoked some
rethinking, that throughout the development of the fair use doctrine, courts had failed to fashion a set of governing principles or
values.”134 Toward a Fair Use Standard intertwines those overarching fair use analysis issues with questions he had faced in his challenged opinions regarding the use of unpublished copyrighted materials.135 Judge Leval contends that by developing a deeper understanding of the four fair use factors judges can achieve a more consistent fair use analysis.
In Leval’s view, “factor one is the soul of fair use.”136 In appraising the first factor he presents the idea of “transformative
use” which later became critical in Justice Souter’s opinion in
Campbell.137 Leval discusses that the purpose and character of the
132
133
134
135
136
137

See id. at 663.
See id. at 660.
Leval, supra note 7, at 1105.
See generally id. at 1105–06.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1111; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
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secondary use turns on the idea of whether that use is transformative, that it must be “productive and employ the quoted matter in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”138
While Leval does not paint the idea of transformative as singularly
focused, he specifically states “[t]ransformative uses may include
criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of the original
author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it.”139 It stands to reason that the
reference to these “transformative” uses of information is intended to hearken back to his decisions in Salinger and New Era.
Noting that transformative changes can apply to parodies, symbolic transformations, and “innumerable other uses,” Judge Leval
supports the idea that “the existence of any identifiable transformative objective does not, however, guarantee success in claiming
fair use.”140 In his article, Leval identifies the issues the court of
appeals found with his decisions in both Salinger and New Era, and
accepts that his opinions may have been incorrect.141 At the same
time, he focuses on the idea that quotations from unpublished copyrighted works are not necessarily outside the scope of the transformative concept he has espoused. In concluding his assessment
of the first factor, Leval writes that “[the first factor] calls for a
careful evaluation whether the particular quotation is of the transformative type that advances knowledge and the progress of the
arts or whether it merely repackages, free riding on another’s creation.”142 The idea that Leval would contend that the quotation
must be transformative resonates with the fact that the underlying
purpose of writing Toward a Fair Use Standard may have been
more directed at rebutting the decisions rendered by the court of
appeals overturning Judge Leval’s opinions in Salinger and New
Era, and rather than clarifying the fair use analysis as Judge Leval
maintained. Here, Leval uses his own overturned case as part of the
basis for the new reasoning of how all judges should identify and
assign weight to the four factors of the fair use defense.
138
139
140
141
142

Leval, supra note 7, at 1111.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1113–15.
Id. at 1116 (emphasis added).
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In assessing the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work, Leval explains that this factor originated from the idea of the
“value of the materials used” as noted in Folsom.143 Leval suggests
that while important, “the second factor should not turn solely, nor
even primarily” on the nature of the work as published or unpublished.144 Again, as in his opinion in New Era, Leval justifies the
position by noting that the Supreme Court did not exclude unpublished works from qualifying for fair use protections in Nation.145
Leval focuses the discussion of the second fair use factor on both of
his cases which the court of appeals had distinguished, in addition
to asserting that a court has the ability to allow quotations from unpublished works.146
Judge Leval’s article does not bring any significantly new perspective to the third or fourth fair use factors.147 For the third factor,
Leval notes that generally, the larger the amount taken, the less
likely it is that the new work will qualify as a fair use. Again, to illustrate this point Leval cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Nation.148 Judge Leval also states that courts must be fluid in their assessment of the third factor, and argues that to perform their duties
historians and journalists must be allowed to quote and use certain
historically accurate statements in secondary work.149 The fact that
the court is given the authority to determine whether material
lifted is substantial or not must go hand in hand with the fourth factor, proving the real affect of the substantiality of the taking.150 For
the fourth factor, Judge Leval asserts that judges and courts should
recognize that the release of a new product will always have some
effect on the existing market.151 Leval cautions against the Supreme
143

Id. at 1117 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175 (Cir. Ct. D.Mass. 1841)).
See Leval, supra note 7, at 1118.
145
See id.
146
Id. at 1117–21.
147
See id. at 1122–25 (evaluating the third and fourth factors of the fair use analysis in
light of the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court decision in Nation, and Folsom v. Marsh
but bringing in no alternative scholarship rebutting the traditional view of these factors).
148
See id. at 1123.
149
See id.
150
See id. at 1124.
151
See id. (“By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because
the secondary user has not paid royalties. . . . It does not necessarily follow that the fair
use doctrine diminishes the revenue of copyright holders. If a royalty obligation attached
144
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Court’s reasoning in Nation, which focused on the fourth factor
being ultimately important in determining a fair use analysis.152
Whereas the Supreme Court was concerned with the marketability
of President Ford’s memoir, Leval maintains that “not every type
of market impairment opposes fair use.”153 If Leval were to concede that the fourth factor was at times most important, it would
limit his own thesis, holding the first factor and the transformative
nature of copyrighted uses as most important.
In addition to Leval’s assessment of the four factors enumerated in the Copyright Act, he also writes of the false fair-use factors and injunctions for infringing works. Leval explains that while
the four factors are specifically enumerated in the Copyright Act,
there may be other additional “false” factors a judge might consider to play a role in the application of a fair use defense, but which
should not be allowed to impact a judgment: (1) good faith; (2) artistic integrity; and (3) privacy.154 Judge Leval also writes of injunctions, and whether they are a proper remedy for a failed fair use
defense.155 Leval specifically noted that with the types of cases he
spoke of in the article, those dealing with the use of unpublished
material in a commercial publication, “the customary bias in favor
of the injunctive remedy” should not apply.156 Leval proposed that
copyright law does not provide injunctive relief for a public figure
to stop the publication of material which might reveal them to be
“dishonest, cruel, or greedy,” nor does it prevent the printing of
information which a private individual might “prefer to keep secret.”157 Injunctions granted for copyright infringements should
to every secondary use, many would simply forgo use of the primary material in favor of
free substitutes.”)
152
See id.
153
Id. at 1125.
154
See Leval, supra note 7, at 1125–30. (noting that these false factors “may have
bearing on the appropriate remedy, or on the availability of another cause of action to
vindicate a wrong, but not on the fair use defense”).
155
See id. at 1130–1135 (“When a court rejects a fair use defense, it should deal with the
issue of the appropriate remedy on its merits. The court should grant or deny the
injunction for reasons, and not simply as a mechanical reflex to a finding of infringement.
Plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate irreparable harm and inadequacy of
compensation in damages.”).
156
Id. at 1133.
157
Id. at 1134.
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only be declared based on the merits of the copyright law issues.158
Leval concludes the article by reinforcing the idea that there is no
good bright-line standard for determining fair use.159 However,
through establishing a system of analysis which takes into account
the factors as he sees them, there would be a chance for “greater
consistency and predictability of court decisions by disciplined focus on the utilitarian, public enriching objectives of copyright—and
by resisting the impulse to import extraneous policies.”160
Both the reasoning behind Leval’s article and the motive for its
writing have been criticized since its release. Published in same
Harvard Law Review edition, Professor Lloyd Weinreb’s article
Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine acts as a foil for the
arguments raised in Toward a Fair Use Standard.161 Professor
Weinreb similarly finds the courts and Congress have left a confusing set of decisions regarding fair use.162 However, Weinreb argues
that many commentators, including Judge Leval, “considerably
mistake what fair use is all about.”163 Weinreb explains that Leval’s
system which sets out to, in principle, delineate when a secondary
use should be considered fair and when such a use would be an infringement, is not as reliable as a system developed out of judgedetermined rulings.164 Weinreb’s notion is that the judicial interpretations and determinations as to what is “fair,” are in actuality
more beneficial in developing a clear fair use doctrine.165 Weinreb
recognized that copyright cases involving fair use had become confusing for judges, as evidenced by overturned decisions. Such decisions, like those presided over by Leval, had become common nature.166 Perhaps ultimately, by amassing a larger volume of judicial
precedent, Congress may be better able to supply the judiciary with
clearer legislative guidelines, narrowing the leeway given to judges
158

Id.
Id. at 1135.
160
Id.
161
Lloyd Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1137 (1990).
162
See id.
163
Id. at 1138.
164
Id.
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See id.
166
Id. at 1137–38 (“Development of the doctrine of fair use out to proceed, therefore,
not by deduction from principle but by induction from concrete cases.”).
159
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in determining the applicability of a fair use defense. Weinreb’s
opinion differs from Judge Leval’s presupposition that fair use
should be decided strictly according to the “utilitarian premises of
the copyright scheme as a whole, to the exclusion of every other
consideration.”167 His focus revolves around the idea of “fairness”
as opposed to the determination which Leval professes focuses
primarily on the promotion of “production and dissemination of
works of creative authorship.”168
Disagreeing with many of Leval’s main points, Professor Weinreb works his way through each of Judge Leval’s arguments, noting
differences in their understanding of the four factors.169 For the
first factor, Weinreb recognizes the importance that Leval places
on what is “transformative” and what is not.170 However, Weinreb
comments, “transformative use is at most a limiting test, apt for
uses that demonstrably serve neither a public purpose nor a socially
recognized private purpose.”171 To give this higher standing than
the other factors—as Judge Leval does—is to conceal the other
factors behind a veil of unimportance, which was not Congress’
intent in crafting the Copyright Act as a balancing test.172 Unlike
Leval, Weinreb sees the second factor as more than just an argument for the ability to use unpublished works, but rather as a need
to guard against public use of private works, protecting the interests of privacy as well as property.173
While Weinreb concludes that Leval is correct in noting that a
strict quantity test is not adequate and that the third factor must be
viewed in concert with the first and fourth factors, he disagrees
that a “transformative” use may be able to overcome the obstacle
of using too liberal a quantity of copyrighted work.174 With regard
to the fourth factor, Weinreb accepts that Judge Leval’s inclination
is correct, and that there may always be an effect on the market
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id. at 1140.
See id. at 150.
See id. at 1141–1148.
Id. at 1142–43.
Id. at 1144.
Id.
See id. at 1145–46.
See id. at 1146.
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from a fair use of a work.175 Weinreb also seems to agree with Leval
that the Supreme Court’s analysis of the fourth factor as the most
important should not be adhered to at the exclusion of the other
factors.176 However, Weinreb disagrees with Leval that the importance of the effect on the market should be disregarded in exchange
for a highly transformative work, which may reject an owner’s privacy or property claims.177
While Judge Leval’s article attempted to explain fair use in a
way which might provide greater consistency to the doctrine and
offer judges a more standardized path to follow when deciding cases, Weinreb maintained his belief that judges need not exclude other considerations, seemingly including the “false factors” noted by
Leval, from the fair use analysis. Weinreb also asserted that the
Copyright Act intended factors other than those mentioned in the
Act to be taken into account.178 “Fairness is a particularly open
concept,” wrote Weinreb, “on which almost any of the facts in a
concrete situation may have a bearing.”179 Though even Weinreb
admits that the concept of fairness is rather ambiguous, perhaps
even a bit “too vague,” he still contends that the even without the
best possible legislative guidance, if the courts use use normative
reasoning then perhaps they will still able to determine what is
“fair.”180 Justice Souter’s opinion in Campbell seemed to draw
upon Toward a Fair Use Standard, in effect requiring judges to conform to Leval’s methodology for dealing with fair use analyses.181
III. TOWARD A NEW FAIR USE STANDARD
Even though Toward a Fair Use Standard was mainly intended
as a reactionary piece in part focused on the idea of applying the
fair use doctrine to unpublished works, the article became a focal
point for the development of transformative works protected under
the fair use doctrine. Justice Souter’s use of the article as a basis for
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

See id.
See id. at 1146–47.
See id. at 1151.
See id. at 1152.
Id. at 1152.
See id. at 1153.
See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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his opinion in Campbell set the tone for how transformative works
would be viewed under fair use analyses in the future. In Campbell,
the copyright owners of the song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by Roy Orbison sued the hip-hop group 2 Live Crew for copyright infringement, based on the group’s lewd rendition entitled “Pretty Woman.”182 The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the court of appeals, reversed that decision, finding
the rap group’s parody was not fair use of copyrighted song.183 In
an opinion by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court held that commercial character of song parody did not create presumption
against fair use.184 Although Justice Souter first notes Judge Leval’s
article when discussing the history of “fair abridgments,”185 the
most important references are at the end of the opinion’s introduction. Judge Souter noted that each of the factors “are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright.”186 By stating this and referring to Leval, Justice Souter
seems to indicate that courts should adhere to the standard Leval
set for weighing the fair use factors. The second major reference to
Judge Leval’s article is found in Justice Souter’s explanation of the
first factor of copyright. Justice Souter explains that a first factor
test boils down to whether the potentially infringing work is transformative, and to what extent.187 Here Justice Souter seems to accept the premise of Judge Leval’s article calling for the examination
of fair use under the guise of creating a more utilitarian copyright
scheme: “Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of trans-

182

Id. at 573. Orbison’s original song spoke of a “pretty woman, walkin’ down the
street” and the ensuing attempt of a man to get her to notice him as she walks by him.
Alternatively, the version created by 2 Live Crew was of a different ilk. The parody spoke
of four different women, one pretty, one hairy, one bald, and yet another who was
cheating on her boyfriend. In each of those verses the women are either objectified or
derided. The two songs were about as different as possible while still employing the same
basic underlying musical composition.
183
See id.
184
See id. at 584.
185
Id. at 576.
186
Id. at 578.
187
See id. at 579.
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formative works.”188 Thus, Justice Souter refocused copyright and
the application of the fair use doctrine into a concept based on the
idea of transformative use. Although Justice Souter examined the
other three fair use factors, it was the transformative nature of the
song as a parody identified in the first factor that outweighed the
other factors.189 By utilizing Judge Leval’s article in the opinion,
Justice Souter himself transformed into law an article that was
seemingly written as a response to the court of appeals distinguishing two of Leval’s cases.
A month after the Campbell opinion was handed down, Judge
Leval delivered an address at Cardozo Law School, which was
transcribed and published in the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment
Law Journal, titled Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of
Fair Use.190 Amid the flowery language and the thanks Judge Leval
extended to Justice Souter for having cited his article, Judge Leval
explained that the opinion suggested copyright law was finally on
the right track after having “been lost adrift for a turbulent decade.”191 Leval asserted that with the decision in Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. the Supreme Court had lost
sight of the necessity of finding productivity as an essential requirement for a fair use.192 This, Judge Leval explained, was how
fair use and copyright law had originally lost its way. Now, with
Justice Souter’s holding in Campbell, Leval proclaimed that the
Supreme Court had “fixed the rudder and restored the compass
bearing” for copyright.193
While he believed the ship had been righted, Leval acknowledged that Souter’s opinion would not satisfy the entire “copyright
community.”194 In spite of this, Leval felt the Supreme Court had
188

Id.
See id. at 585–95.
190
Pierre Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19 (1994).
191
Id. at 19.
192
See id. at 19–20 n.4. (“The Court in Sony held that private home videotaping of a
copyrighted television program to be used solely to permit a one-time private noncommercial home viewing at a time more convenient than the hour of broadcast, would
not infringe the copyright because it would constitute a fair use.”) (emphasis added).
193
Id. at 22.
194
See id. at 23.
189
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set right the fair use analysis’ focus, emphasizing that courts
should view the factors in concert with one another, while placing
an emphasis on the “productive” or “transformative use.”195 For
Leval, Campbell was a vindication of his opinions in Salinger and
New Era. His lecture was a victory lap, producing no new salient
insights on copyright or fair use. Rather, it was “a toast to fair
use . . . now refixed . . . on its goal,” for which Leval felt he had
been an inspiration.196
Judge Leval again spoke about his article and the fair use doctrine at the annual Nimmer Lecture at UCLA in 1997. He concluded his speech with the following,
I return, in conclusion, to the great Mel Nimmer.
He recognized that the inclusion of superfluous
words in the [copyright] statute was likely to cause
trouble. While the fair use statute was under consideration, he recommended that it be pared down to
the bare bones: “fair use . . . is not an infringement.” Had his wisdom been followed, many of
these quixotic misadventures might have been
avoided.197
Yet this is perhaps the opposite of what Judge Leval advocated
for in Toward a Fair Use Standard. Toward a Fair Use Standard can
be seen as having a dual nature. The article asserts that Leval’s
opinions in Salinger and New Era were correct and that the court of
appeals was misguided in reversing and challenging his judgments.198 At the same time, however, it advocates for the utilitarian
purpose of the copyright act as it applies to the fair use doctrine.199
Both natures, are linked under the guise of discussing the issues,
pitfalls, and solutions to dealing with fair use.200 Thereby, it is
195

Id. (noting the most important footnote of Campbell was likely to be footnote 10,
which directly referenced his article, commenting that injunctions are not always the most
appropriate remedy in cases of borrowing).
196
Leval, supra note 184, at 26.
197
Pierre Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1466 (1997).
198
Id. at 1461–62.
199
See Leval, supra note 7, at 1135.
200
Mitch Tuchman, Judge Leval’s Transformation Standard: Can it Really Distinguish
Foul from Fair?, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 101, 106 (2003). Tuchman himself offers a
critique of Leval that eventually reaches the conclusion that Leval’s standard has been
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possible that those who subscribe to Leval’s view “might easily . . . fail to ponder whether transformative use is a diaphanous
veil . . . behind which subscribing judges . . . continue in close cases
to permit aesthetics to operate as an inarticulable test in copyright
law.”201 Leval himself made no claim for the utility of this doctrine
beyond its relation to “the second author” including historians,
biographers, journalists, and critics.202
IV. TRANSFORMATIVE USE TODAY AND LEVAL’S LEGACY
In the twenty years since Campbell was decided, there has been
an increase of cases in which courts find that transformative secondary use is fair use.203 There are two specific trends which must
be noted when discussing the growth of transformative uses as an
aspect of the fair use defense: that the transformative use test is
applied by almost all courts when faced with a fair use defense; and
that courts are placing much more apparent worth on the first factor and the transformative nature of the secondary use, almost to
the exclusion of the other three factors.204 This trend is alarming as
Judge Leval’s article was not intended to make the first factor the
only factor taken into consideration, but rather to prove that transformative uses should be weighed according to the utilitarian value
of the product created by the secondary user in relation to the other
factors.205 However, even though there may still be debate as to the
used by a variety of courts, but there has been little consistency or predictability with the
outcome of such cases.
201
Id. at 102.
202
See id. at 118.
203
See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537
(2009).
204
See Jennifer Pinto, Has the Transformative Use Test Swung the Pendulum Too Far in
Favor of Secondary Users?, 56 ADVOC. (Idaho) 26, 28–29 (2013) (discussing collected
empirical evidence to show the statistics for each of these contentions. Between 20012010 the Defendant won in 100% of cases when the court found the secondary use is
transformative).
205
Leval, supra note 7, at 1110–11. (“Following Story’s articulation, the statute lists four
pertinent ‘factors to be considered’ ‘in determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use.’ They are, in summary, the purpose and character of the
use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the quantity and importance of the material used,
and the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work. Each
factor directs attention to a different facet of the problem. The factors do not represent a
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reasons for the creation of copyright law, whether for the utilitarian
purpose Leval holds, or to “promote and foster creative growth in
the sciences, arts and other creative endeavors,” the two are best
balanced when a compromise can be struck between the rights of
copyright holders and the legitimate need to protect the creative
pursuits of secondary users.206
Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard spoke of the “writers, publishers and other would-be fair-users,” who “lack a reliable guide
on how to govern their conduct.”207 That ever-expanding guide on
conduct has been clearly advanced by three recent decisions: Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.,208 Cariou v. Prince,209 and Kienitz v. Sconnie
Nation LLC210. The two former cases illustrate that the recent shift
toward favoring the first fair use factor and the transformative use
over the three other fair use factors has taken too large a foothold in
the determinations of what can be held as a fair use, the latter that
judges and circuits are still split as to how to proceed with a fair use
analysis. Decided by the Second Circuit, Cariou dealt with the fair
use appropriation of portraits and landscape photographs taken by
Patrick Cariou, a professional photographer who collected images
over a six-year period of living among the Rastafarians.211 Cariou
compiled the portraits into a coffee-table book entitled Yes Rasta,
which, prior to the suit, had sold 5,791 copies.212 Aside from those
sales, which netted Cariou approximately $8,000, Cariou never
licensed or sold the photographs to any other individual.213 Richard
Prince, a well-known appropriations artist, came across Yes Rasta
in a bookstore, and proceeded to create thirty pieces of art using
images from Cariou’s work.214 Some of the images were merely the
scorecard that promises victory to the winner of the majority. Rather, they direct courts
to examine the issue from every pertinent corner and to ask in each case whether, and
how powerfully, a finding of fair use would serve or disserve the objectives of the
copyright.”).
206
See Pinto, supra note 204, at 30.
207
Leval, supra note 7, at 1135.
208
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).
209
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
210
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
211
See id. at 699.
212
See id.
213
See id.
214
See id.
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original Yes Rasta prints with altered color schemes and separate
images photoshopped and layered on top of the print. Others were
more overtly changed, with multiple layers of color and additional
elements altering the perspective and theme.215 Cariou found out
about Prince’s appropriation of his work and filed suit for copyright
infringement.216 Despite the district court’s initial finding that all of
Cariou’s works were protected by fair use, the Second Circuit
found that all but five of the thirty works created by Prince were
protected as fair uses and the remaining five works would be decided by the district court on remand.217 The opinion based its interpretation on the theory that Prince’s secondary use was transformative, with support taken both from Campbell and from Leval’s
Toward a Fair Use Standard stating that the secondary use “must
be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different
manner or for a different purpose from the original.”218 However,
the works appropriated by Prince were, even by his own admission,
not transformed to a great degree.219
Though twenty-five of the images qualified for the fair use defense, the court took issue with five of Prince’s altered images.220 It
recognized that these works neither provided sufficient commentary on the originals, nor a distinct enough image or feeling from
the original to be seen as transformative. When examining the
fourth of the fair use factors, the court concluded that the five images the court took issue with did “not sufficiently differ from the
photographs of Cariou’s that they incorporate”, and retained the
“cumulative effect” presented in the originals.221 Judge Wallace,
concurring and dissenting with the opinion, remarked “I fail to see
how the majority in its appellate role can ‘confidently’ draw a dis215

See id. at 699–700.
See id. at 704.
217
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Cairou v. Prince, 784 F.
Supp. 2d 337, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
218
Leval, supra note 6, at 1111.
219
See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. (As a part of his deposition Prince noted that “do [es]n’t
really have a message,” that he was not “trying to create anything with a new meaning or
a new message,” and that he “do[es]n’t have any . . . interest in [Cariou’s] original
intent.”).
220
Id. at 698-9.
221
See id. at 710–11.
216
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tinction between the twenty-five works that do not readily lend
themselves to a fair use determination.”222 He continued:
Certainly we are not merely to use our personal art
views to make the legal application to the facts of
this case . . . I mean no disrespect to the majority,
but I, for one, do not believe that I am in a position
to make these fact and opinion intensive decisions
on the twenty-five works that passed the majority’s
judicial observation.223
The ruling in Cariou became the broadest application of what
had been considered transformative.224 The problem presented was
that, especially with appropriation art, judges are now called to
question what is transformative in the first place. In addition,
judges are seemingly required to make determinations about fair
use according to their subjective opinions and not according to a
principled set of guidelines as Leval hoped to formulate.225 Judge
Leval’s proposed system may serve to further confuse what is a
derivative work and what is a transformative work, requiring that
decision to come from a judge’s subjective artistic impression.
While this distinction poses a rather focused doctrinal issue, the
necessity for a clear framework would be called into question, forcing artists to risk more by publicly presenting their work.226
The problem of applying the fair use doctrine with regard to
transformative secondary uses is not, however, confined to the
Second Circuit. The Ninth Circuit court of appeals recently built
on the Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou and gave even greater
deference to the transformation of copyrighted material in Seltzer
v. Green Day, Inc. The case involved Green Day’s use of the image
entitled Scream Icon created by artist and illustrator Derek Seltzer.227 The image appears as a woman’s face, mid scream with a
222

Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
224
See Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Copyright Law – Fair Use – Second Circuit Holds That
Appropriation Artwork Need Not Comment on the Original to be Transformative – Cariou v.
Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 1228, 1228 (2013).
225
See id. at 1234.
226
See id. at 1235.
227
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2013).
223
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close perspective on the mouth, seemingly mid-scream. Scream
Icon appeared in a video incorporated into the backdrop for the
band’s concerts between July and November 2009.228 The only
visible changes made to the original image were a red cross placed
over the middle of the face and black streaks added to the right side
of the image.229 Just as the Second Circuit had done, the Ninth
Circuit found that the appropriation of the image was a fair use,
even though the work was not significantly altered, and in spite of
the fact that Green Day’s use still featured the image as “street
art.”230 Not only was the image appropriated by Green Day in the
same “street art” setting as the artist originally intended it, but it
was used by the band for a commercial purpose. Instead of finding
in favor of Seltzer, the court held that the additional content incorporated to the original to slightly alter the image was enough to
consider it transformative.231
Under the court’s analysis of the first factor, the transformative
use in Seltzer does not necessarily conform to the standard set by
Leval and utilized by Campbell. The court in Seltzer specifically
cites, and implicitly accepts Leval’s explanation of what is transformative.232 “Green Day used the original as ‘raw material’ in the
construction of the four-minute video backdrop. It is not simply a
quotation or a republication, although Scream Icon is prominent, it
remains only a component of what is essentially a street-art focused
music video.”233 Although, in his article, Judge Leval holds fast to
the idea that “the existence of any identifiable transformative objective does not, however, guarantee success in claiming fair
use.”234
Leval persisted that the extent and use of the material must still
be taken in concert with the other factors, each of which should be
scrutinized to determine if the use of copyrighted material may still
228

See id. at 1174.
See id.
230
Kim J. Landsman, Does Cariou v. Prince Represent the Apogee or Burn-out of
Transformativeness in Fair Use Jurisprudence? A Plea for a Neo-Traditional Approach, 24
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 321, 366–67 (2014).
231
See id. at 367.
232
See Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1176 (citing Leval, supra note 7, at 1111).
233
Id.
234
Leval, supra note 6, at 1111.
229
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be considered a fair use.235 Following this procedure, the Ninth
Circuit engaged in the necessary analysis of the other fair use factors. The second factor in the fair use test favored Seltzer. Though
the image had been publicly displayed, it was still a “creative work,
meriting strong protection under this factor.”236 The court held
that the third factor, the extent of the work taken, “does not weigh
against Green Day.”237 However, this assertion appears to be mistaken. Though the court noted that the image was “not meaningfully divisible,” even Leval recognized that the greater the percentage of a work taken the less likely a fair use could be found.238 In
Seltzer the entire image was appropriated.239 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit found that the fourth factor weighed in favor of Green Day as
Seltzer accepted that the value of his work had not decreased.240
It seems that, perhaps as trends indicate, the court was swayed
more by the idea that the use of the image was transformative, and
therefore a fair use, then it was by whether Green Day’s appropriation of the work met the utilitarian aspect of copyright as suggested
by Leval. This forces one to reflect on an excerpt from the conclusion of Leval’s article. “The stimulation of creative thought and
authorship for the benefit of society depends assuredly on the protection of the author’s monopoly. But it depends equally on the
recognition that the monopoly must have limits.”241 What value
then, according to Leval’s reasoning, does the use of a copyrighted
image have in the background of a Green Day concert? It is unlikely
that the band’s use would have met the threshold of which Judge
Leval spoke in Toward a Fair Use Standard. Leval had been swayed
by the fact that he believed the appropriation of unpublished letters
added value to the biographies referenced in Salinger and New
Era.242 There is the likelihood that even Leval may not have view
Seltzer through the same lens of transformativeness.

235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

See id. at 1122–23.
Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1178.
Id. at 1179.
See Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1179; Leval, supra note 6, at 1122.
See Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1178–79.
See id.
Leval, supra note 6, at 1136.
See id. at 1114.
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Although Cariou had been criticized by both law review articles
and amicus curie, until the decision in Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation
LLC, no circuit court decision had ever disagreed with the transformative ideas behind the Second Circuit’s decision. Much like
with Cariou and Seltzer, Sconnie pertained to the unauthorized use
of a copyrighted photograph, out of which a new “work” was
created. Sconnie Nation LLC, an apparel company dedicated to
creating clothes for University of Wisconsin students and fans,
created a shirt design for the school’s 2012 Mifflin Street Block
Party.243 The shirt featured an image of Paul Soglin, Mayor of
Madison, Wisconsin. The image had been copied, tinted a green
color, and the words “Sorry for Partying” were written next to his
face.244 The photographer of the original image, Michael Kienitz,
became aware that his image was being used for this purpose, copyrighted the work, and initiated the lawsuit for copyright infringement against Sconnie Nation LLC.245 Though the circuit court
upheld the district court’s decision that the use of the copyrighted
image was protected by the fair use defense, Judge Easterbrook’s
opinion questioned whether the “transformative use” argument is
appropriate in making such determinations.246 Judge Easterbrook
specifically targets the idea of transformative as decided in Cariou
noting:
We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because asking exclusively whether something is “transformative” not only replaces the list in § 107 but also
could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects
derivative works. To say that a new use transforms
the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and
thus, one might suppose, protected under § 106(2).
Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do
no explain how every “transformative use” can be
“fair use” without extinguishing the author’s rights
under § 106(2).247
243
244
245
246
247

See Sconnie, 766 F.3d at 757.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id.
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Judge Easterbrook settles his assessment of the fair use argument by looking at the statutory list as noted in 17 U.S.C. § 107,
focusing on the fourth factor.248
In focusing on the fourth factor, the circuit court’s assessment
of the fair use defense fell mostly on the understanding that although Sconnie Nation LLC could have used any image of the
Mayor, there was, in effect, no market for the copyrighted image.249 Kienitz had licensed the image to the Mayor’s office for no
royalty.250 The image was available for all to download and view at
no cost.251 There was also no real secondary market for the image,
nor did Kienitz have any plans to distribute the image as a part of
any apparel.252 While the use of the image may have injured the
future opportunities Kienitz was offered due to negative publicity,
that was not the argument he presented in the suit.253
Judge Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard, which was in effect
canonized by Justice Souter’s opinion in Campbell, and later referenced in Cariou and Seltzer as a foundation for the broad scope of
transformativeness, seemingly removes a portion of what had once
been considered “fair” about the fair use doctrine. Professor
Weinreb criticized this very issue. Weinreb delved into the idea
that the transformative approach espoused by Judge Leval is not
necessarily as fair as he had contended.254 By equating the first factor of the fair use defense to the “soul of fair use,” the concept of a
work being transformative is no longer merely part of one of the
four factors that must all be given equal weight. Leval’s doctrine
holds transformativeness paramount in achieving the utilitarian
purpose of the Copyright Act. But what exactly is transformative?
As is evidenced by his decision in American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., even Judge Leval did not find all secondary uses of co-

248
249
250
251
252
253
254

Id.
Id. at 758–59.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Weinreb, supra note 161, at 1138–40.
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pyrighted material transformative.255 In many ways, Leval’s article
has helped to usher in a period when a “transformative” or “productive” use is simply creating a new work or product with enough
differences from the original to be considered something new.256
Allowing judges to determine what is productive or transformative
may fall outside of the scope of what is in actuality “fair” for the
creators of original works.257
Judge Leval’s conclusion in Toward a Fair Use Standard attempted to bring his discussion of the fair use factors full circle. He
reminded readers of the trouble Justice Story experienced with Folsom when determining whether an appropriation of copyrighted
material was acceptable. “It is not . . . easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to
all cases.”258 To that end, Judge Leval wrote his article to propose
a better test, a “bright-line standard” which could be used to give
fair use “greater consistency and predictability” in court decisions.259 As fate would have it, the fair use mantle was passed from
Story to Leval through Justice Souter and the Supreme Court, who
made it law in Campbell. Today, fair use remains problematic. Decisions such as Cariou and Seltzer, which extend the reach of the
transformative use as a fair use defense, seem to push Leval’s rather focused article further and further away from its original purpose. Others, such as Sconnie, show a disagreement between the
circuit courts and judges as to the application of Leval’s principles,
reminding readers that transformativeness is “not one of the statu-

255

802 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (not requiring that a transformative use test be
taken to judge the question of fair use despite engaging in a transformative analysis), aff’d,
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
256
See Tuchman, supra note 200, at 125.
257
See id. (“In truth, the facts in Texaco do not require transformation to adjudicate the
question of fair use. Scientists at the defendant oil company admitted routinely
photocopying articles in academic journals in order to keep bound copies circulating
efficiently among their colleagues, in order to amass personal libraries at their fingertips,
in order to have disposable copies available for use in their laboratories. Whether or not
xerography is transformational sees irrelevant to the fair use question—Sony should have
provided that answer—but Leval imposed his test, preceding his conclusions with a
curious retelling of the history of fair use.”).
258
Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175, 344 (Cir. Ct. D.Mass. 1841).
259
Leval, supra note 7, at 1135.
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tory factors, though the Supreme Court mentioned it in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose.”260
Toward a Fair Use Standard, initially a reaction to overturned
and distinguished rulings, may have led a once “fair” public policy
into rather “foul” territory.
CONCLUSION
Toward a Fair Use Standard has grown from humble beginnings
as a law review article, perhaps written as a reaction to the displeasure Judge Leval felt at having two of his decisions overturned, into
a pillar on which current copyright law is shakily based. While it is
unlikely that such a statement will ever fully be substantiated, the
growth and change of transformativeness in regard to fair use defenses is clear. Perhaps, due to recent circuit disagreements, in the
years to come, legislative changes will be made to the Copyright
Act. Hopefully such changes will eliminate some of the ambiguity
in the fair use analysis, taking the decisions out of the hands of
judges and placing it into a clearly defined doctrine. For now
though, Leval, his judgments, and the impact of his work are clearly recognized.

260

Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758. Judge Easterbrook also critiques
the Second Circuit’s suggestion “that ‘transformative use’ is enough to bring a modified
copy within the scope of § 107.” Id.

